ORANGE BOOK STANDARDS: SECURITY AFTER 9/11 MORE THAN TECHIE ISSUES
Filed Wednesday, August 2. 2006
Security issues are not just a techie thing. Security should be viewed as a high-level area of concern that spans across systems, network infrastructures and facilities. Has your organization learned anything from the events of Sept. 11, 2001? Does your company fully understand risk management aside from computer security? Has your firm spent a lot of money on “hardening” your facility in the last five years? Do you think that money was well spent or wasted? These are all questions that better have good answers when you review your organization’s readiness to respond to security breaches in technology and physical facilities as well as various forms of natural and man-made disasters Go and read some of the job openings for security and risk management people in various organizations. Just by the requirements they list, you can quickly determine how they view network and enterprise system security as well as how they value the oversight in these areas. Some are looking too much for techies instead of senior-level executives. I just spent a week in a CISSP course that covered several areas of security as part of a 10-domain curriculum. Physical security was part of the topics covered as well as network and system security including disaster recovery and business continuity. While all of these areas have technical elements, you need to get someone who grasps the big picture if you want your organization to apply the right resources. The range of options and price tags are staggering for software, hardware and other devices. Your company likely isn’t getting its money’s worth. When it comes to valuating risk and determining how to mitigate risk, there are guidelines to look at and use as a benchmark. These guidelines for security in computer systems are defined in a government publication called the Orange Book. Coincidently, there is also another Orange Book that was published in Great Britain that focuses on risk assessment and risk management. Both are worth reviewing. DoD Orange Book Standard It is said that many organizations still use the government’s Orange Book as a reference to classify computer security. In this U.S. Department of Defense standard (DoD publication 5200.28: “Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria”), there are four divisions of security that systems are rated into (see table below). DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARD TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA DIVISION OF SYSTEMS SUB-CATEGORY DESCRIPTION D – MINIMAL PROTECTION DIVISION D - Those systems that have been evaluated but that fail to meet the requirements for a higher evaluation class. C – DISCRETIONARY PROTECTION C1 – DISCRETIONARY SECURITY PROTECTION C2 – CONTROLLED ACCESS PROTECTION DIVISION C - Applies to TCB (Trusted Computer Bases) with optional object protection (file, directory, devices, etc). Provides for discretionary (need-to-know) protection. B – MANDATORY PROTECTION B1 – LABELLED SECURITY PROTECTION B2 – STRUCTURED PROTECTION B3 – SECURITY DOMAINS DIVISION B – Specifies that TCB protection systems should be mandatory, not discretionary. Must provide a evidence to demonstrate that the reference monitor concept has been implemented. A – VERIFIED PROTECTION A1 – VERIFIED PROTECTION A2 – NOT YET FORMALLY DEFINED DIVISION A – Highest security division. Extensive documentation is required to demonstrate that the TCB meets the security requirements in all aspects of design, development and implementation These divisions provide a graduated level of confidence in the overall security of classified and sensitive information. An interesting fact is that this standard is dated Dec. 1985, which superseded an earlier standard established in 1983. You would think there would be some additional criteria and/or categories added onto it by now. Another Orange Book: The Queen’s In doing some research, there is another Orange Book out there focused on the “Management of Risk: Principles and Concepts,” which is published by Her Majesty’s Treasury. This book was published in 2004 and is a much better read than the DoD’s Orange Book. It provides a risk management model as well as chapters discussing identifying risks, assessing risks, risk environment and context and other chapters focusing on risk management. Within the Orange Book published by Her Majesty’s Treasury, they define three important principles for assessing risk:
I believe it’s a much better read because it was written after Sept. 11, 2001; it focuses on a more strategic view rather than a techie view; and has more pictures (models, charts and visualization aids) to help clarify the concepts. Don’t laugh about the pictures comment. You can really visualize the concepts presented in this risk book much faster than just reading the dry text in the DoD book. Using All Resources to Resolve Risks The lesson to be learned here is to go beyond what you normally reach for in trying to solve a problem or when getting some information. While the DoD Orange Book for computer security is of value, several references to it claimed that it was obsolete. Should there be an update to the DoD’s Orange Book? With so many changes in technology, the additional threats that were never thought about 20 years ago and all the changes in global dynamics, there should be a newer version of the Orange Book for computer system security. In doing research on the DoD Orange Book, I believe that coming across the Orange Book of risk management by accident was a real bonus. Getting a different perspective from someone else is of value. With the emphasis on disaster recovery and business continuity from a compliance standpoint in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, organizations should reevaluate their programs and their views on where to put security and risk management within their organization. It is well beyond a techie issue. Carlinism: There are no experts in this industry. The best you can do is to be a good student who is always learning.
Last modified on 2009-01-06 18:47 Trackbacks
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